By Kasey Burton
In Spratt v. Toft, the Washington State Court of Appeals, Division I, held that the King County Superior Court erred in failing to consider whether or not a plaintiff is likely to prevail on his or her defamation claim before dismissing the suit under the Washington Anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) statute.
Spratt, a former sales manager, worked under Toft, also a sales manager, at Quadrant Home Loans. Spratt ultimately quit her job due to Toft’s behavior toward her and her coworkers in the workplace. Spratt was then hired in a different part of the company away from Toft. Spratt later learned that Toft was running for office as a Republican, the same political party Spratt was affiliated with, and confronted him at public meetings. Shortly thereafter, an “anonymous” letter began circulating, which included materials promoting Toft as a candidate, and an anti-harassment order against Spratt. Spratt filed a defamation suit against Toft based on the anonymous letter.
Toft responded by alleging that the suit was a SLAPP suit, as defined in RCW 4.24.525. He then used the anti-SLAPP statute to seek dismissal of Spratt’s lawsuit.
In order to prove a violation of the anti-SLAPP statute, Toft was required to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the claime targeted “protected activity, i.e., activity ‘involving public participation and petition,’ as defined in [the anti-SLAPP statute].” The burden then shifted to Spratt to show by clear and convincing evidence a probability of prevailing on her claim.
Toft was able to establish that his statements were made by a political candidate on the campaign trail to party officials, party members, and the voting public about a candidate’s employment history in response to allegations by a person who attended political events and challenged the candidate’s qualifications. As a result, the speech involved public participation. The trial court agreed, and the Appellate Court upheld that determination. However, after satisfying the first prong, the burden then shifted to Spratt to establish by clear and convincing evidence that it is probable that she would have prevailed on her claim. The trial court did not address this issue at all, requiring the Appellate Court to remand the case for further proceedings. As the Court of Appeals explained:
Indeed the court’s oral ruling specifically states that it did not decide the merits of the case, but only whether the defamation lawsuit should be stricken. The trial court’s ruling shows that it never examined the statements and declarations to determine whether triable issues of material fact existed under any standard.
Editor’s Note (Erica Shelley Nelson): The policy of the anti-SLAPP statute is to prevent the “chilling of free speech,” but it is not intended to protect all speech, only that speech that directly relates to public issues, or matters of public concern. This case would have been decided differently if Toft was not a political candidate providing materials about Spratt for the purpose of defending his qualifications for office. If he had been a private citizen, not running for public office, disseminating false and defamatory information to others about Spratt, the anti-SLAPP statute would not apply.
