By Erica Shelley Nelson and Jordan L. Jones
In Alexander v. Boeing Co., the U.S. District Court, Western District of Washington denied defendant Boeing’s motion for summary judgment. The court found that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding the plaintiff’s claims that Boeing violated the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the Washington Family Medical Leave Act (WFMLA), and the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) when they terminated her employment.
The plaintiff was employed with Boeing from 1996 to 2013. “Since at least 2000, plaintiff’s managers knew that she had migraines and that she missed work due to her migraines.” The plaintiff was informed in 2012 that she could apply for FMLA leave to cover absences caused by her migraines. The plaintiff was subsequently disciplined for “unexcused absences” and her employment was terminated “for ‘job abandonment’ when she did not report to work from April 29 through May 2, 2013.”
Boeing argued that the “plaintiff’s FMLA and WFMLA claims should be dismissed because (1) there is no evidence that plaintiff’s use of FMLA leave was a ‘negative factor’ in Boeing’s decision to terminate her employment, (2) [the plaintiff] . . . was ineligible for FMLA leave after January 1, 2013, and (3) [the plaintiff] . . . did not provide sufficient notice of her request for FMLA leave . . . .”
The court noted that “[s]ummary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court found that:
. . . There is direct evidence that Boeing’s decision to terminate plaintiff was due to her absences . . . [and] if those absences were covered by the FMLA, Boeing’s consideration of those absences as a ‘negative factor’ in the termination decision violated the FMLA.
The court stated that there were genuine disputes as to material facts regarding whether the plaintiff was eligible for FMLA leave and whether plaintiff had sufficient notice of Boeing’s policy that employees must provide notice within two business days of a given absence.
In regards to the WLAD claim, the court noted that “[a] disabled employee has a cause of action for at least two different types of discrimination: (1) failure to accommodate where the employer failed to take steps necessary to accommodate the employee’s condition, and (2) disparate treatment if the employer discriminated against the employee because of her condition.” The court found that there again was a genuine dispute of material fact relating to the WLAD claim. The court stated that “. . . plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence that creates a triable issue of fact regarding whether Boeing’s discipline and termination for plaintiff’s absenteeism (conduct resulting from her migraines) demonstrates discriminatory motive.”
The court denied Boeing’s motion for summary judgment.
Editor’s Note: The Washington federal district court reached the correct conclusion in this case. The court was justifiably persuaded by the evidence that plaintiff made several efforts to notify the employer about her migraine condition, her need for time off, and her specific request for FMLA-protected leave. Importantly, this decision holds that an employer is prohibited from disciplining or terminating an employee for job performance problems, such as absenteeism, that are the direct result of a medical condition for which the employee is seeking FMLA-protected leave to accommodate. If Boeing was able to establish that plaintiff had job performance issues unrelated to her medical condition that alone could justify her termination, this case could have been decided differently.
