Washington Labor and Employment Blog
The latest case law and legal developments in Washington labor & employment law.
By Kate Acheson
When a heterosexual delivery truck driver sued for being called “Big Gay Al” at work, the Washington State Court of Appeals found, in Davis v. Fred’s Appliance Inc.,that the perception of homosexuality is not protected by Washington’s law against discrimination (“WLAD”), RCW 49.60.
By Kate Acheson
In Kiona Benton School District, Decision 11563 (EDUC, 2012), the union alleged that the employer committed an unfair labor practice, in retaliating against three, school district employees who exercised their statutory right to participate in an earlier PERC ULP proceeding. PERC hearing examiner Steve Irvin concluded that even though the employees had engaged in protected activities and the employer’s layoffs arguably violated the collective bargaining agreement, the union did not carry its burden of proof that the employer actions were pretextual.
By Kate Acheson
In Sterling Savings Bank v. Stanley, a Washington District Court rejected Sterling Bank’s argument that receipt of federal Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds, restricts them from making any payment to its Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Mrs. Heidi Stanley, after her termination. The Court found that TARP was not intended to prevent monetary recovery in discrimination suits like Mrs. Stanley’s.
By Kate Acheson
In Loeffelholz v. University of Washington, an asbestos office program coordinator at the University of Washington, Debra Loeffelholz, alleged that James Lukehart, her supervisor from 2003 to early 2006, discriminated against her based on her sexual orientation. Loeffelholz claimed the sexual-orientation-based discrimination created a hostile work environment. Upon review, the State Supreme Court found that Loeffelholz’s claims before the enactment of the amendment adding sexual orientation as a protected class in Washington were unrecoverable because the amendment is not retroactive. However, the Court also found that a jury must resolve the questions of fact arising from the last, potentially post-amendment incident.
